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LONG BOREL GAMES
J. P. AGUILERA
Abstract. We study games of length ω2 with moves in N and Borel payoff.
These are, e.g., games in which two players alternate turns playing digits to
produce a real number in [0, 1] infinitely many times, after which the winner is
decided in terms of the sequence belonging to a Borel set in the product space
[0, 1]N.
The main theorem is that Borel games of length ω2 are determined if, and
only if, for every countable ordinal α, there is a fine-structural, countably
iterable model of Zermelo set theory with α-many iterated powersets above a
limit of Woodin cardinals.
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1. Introduction
Given a Borel subset A of the Hilbert space ℓ2, define a two-player perfect-
information, zero-sum game in which Player I and Player II alternate turns playing
digits x0i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9} infinitely often, giving rise to a real number
x0 =
∞∑
i=0
x0i
10i+1
.
Afterwards, they continue alternating turns to produce real numbers x1, x2, and so
on. To ensure that the sequence belongs to ℓ2, we normalize, e.g., by setting
yi =
xi
i+ 1
.
Player I wins the game if, and only if, ~y ∈ A; otherwise Player II wins. These
are games of transfinite length ω2. (Recall that ω denotes the order-type of the
natural numbers.) It is a natural question whether these games are determined,
i.e., whether one of the players has a winning strategy.
Given A ⊂ [0, 1], the Gale-Stewart game on A is defined as follows: two players, I
and II, alternate infinitely many turns playing digits x(0), x(1), . . ., as before. This
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play gives rise to a real number x ∈ [0, 1] as before. Player I wins the game if, and
only if, x ∈ A; otherwise, Player II wins. We say that a set A ⊂ R is determined if
the game associated to A ∩ [0, 1] is determined.
Our games of length ω2 can be recast in terms of Gale-Stewart games: given A ⊂
[0, 1], players I and II alternate infinitely many turns playing digits x00, x
0
1, x
0
2, . . .;
afterwards, they alternate infinitely many turns playing digits x10, x
1
1, x
1
2, . . .; and so
on. Let
ρ : N× N→ N
be a Borel bijection, e.g.,
(i, j) 7→
1
2
(i + j)(i+ j + 1) + j.
Put
x =
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
i=0
x
j
i
10ρ(i,j)+1
.
Player I wins the game if, and only if, x ∈ A; otherwise, Player II wins.
A third and most useful way of studying these games is in terms of the Baire
space NN: given a Borel A ⊂ NN, two players alternate ω2 many turns playing
elements of N and produce an infinite sequence {xi : i ∈ N}, with xi ∈ N
N. As
before, by means of a Borel bijection, this sequence is identified with an element
x ∈ NN. Player I wins the game if, and only if, x ∈ A; otherwise, Player II wins. It
is this the way in which we will speak of games of length ω2 hereafter. Every Polish
space is a continuous image of NN and Borel sets have enough closure properties
that these forms of determinacy are all equivalent.
——
Zermelo set theory (Z) was introduced in 1908 by E. Zermelo with the goal
of reducing Cantor and Dedekind’s theories to a small collection of principles. It,
together with A. Fraenkel and T. Skolem’s refinements, resulted in Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory (ZF). In this article, Z consists of the axioms of extensionality, separation,
power set, pairing, union, foundation, and infinity; and ZF consists of Z, plus the
axiom(s) of replacement. ZC and ZFC are the results of adding the Axiom of Choice
to Z and ZF, respectively.
Although ZC is a powerful theory in which a great deal of mathematics can be
formalized, there are many examples of theorems that cannot be proved without
the use of the axiom of replacement. An early example of this was that of Borel
determinacy, i.e., whether all Borel subsets of R are determined.
Theorem 1.1 (Martin [Ma75]). Suppose A is Borel. Then A is determined.
Even before Martin’s Borel determinacy theorem had been proved, it was known
that any proof would need essential use of the axiom of replacement:
Theorem 1.2 (Friedman [Fr71]). Borel determinacy is not provable in ZC.
Friedman’s work showed that any proof of Borel determinacy would require the
use of arbitrarily large countable iterations of the power set operator, and Martin’s
work showed that this suffices. A convenient slogan is that Borel determinacy
captures the strength of countably iterated powersets.
It is known that one cannot hope to prove the determinacy of any reasonable
class of non-Borel games within ZFC; however, one can extend ZFC by very natural
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large cardinal axioms, or strengthenings of the axiom of infinity, and use them to
prove the determinacy of games on the natural numbers. These connections between
large cardinal axioms and infinite games have been the focus of extensive study for
decades; some of the most famous results include Martin’s [Ma70] proof of analytic
determinacy, Martin and Steel’s [MaSt89] proof of projective determinacy, and
Woodin’s [Wo88] proof of the Axiom of Determinacy in L(R), the smallest model
of ZF containing all reals and all ordinals. (Recall that the Axiom of Determinacy
is the assertion that every Gale-Stewart game (of length ω) is determined. By
a result of Mycielski and Steinhaus, it is inconsistent with the Axiom of Choice.)
More specifically, Woodin showed that if there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals
and a measurable cardinal greater than them, then the Axiom of Determinacy holds
in L(R). The measurable cardinal is necessary, in the sense that the existence of
infinitely many Woodin cardinals does not imply that the Axiom of Determinacy
holds in L(R).
Our main theorem shows that Borel determinacy for games of length ω2 captures
the strength of countably iterated powersets above a limit of Woodin cardinals.1
Theorem 1.3. The following are equivalent over ZFC:
(1) Borel determinacy for games of length ω2;
(2) For every countable α, there is a countably iterable extender model of ZC
satisfying “Vλ+α exists, where λ is a limit of Woodin cardinals.”
Hence, Borel determinacy for games of length ω2 is a natural example of a
theorem whose strength can only be correctly gauged over ZFC in terms of weaker
set theories. The models referred to in Theorem 1.3 are fine-structural and built
over some x ∈ R. As a consequence thereof, we obtain a result on the provability
of Borel determinacy for games of length ω2 similar to the one for short games:
Corollary 1.4. Borel determinacy for games of length ω2 is provable in the theory
ZFC + “there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals,” but not in the theory ZC +
“there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals.”
The first part of Corollary 1.4 follows from Theorem 1.3, together with a theorem
of Steel [St93] and a reflection argument. Our proof of Theorem 1.3 does not quite
go through if one replaces ZFC by ZC in the statement, although we conjecture that
the equivalence is still provable there. Nonetheless, the proof does go through if one
replaces ZFC by ZC, together with the assumption that there are enough ordinals2
and, in particular, if one assumes that there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals.
This yields the second part of Corollary 1.4.
The main step towards proving Theorem 1.3 is a “shortening” result like the one
in [Ag18a]. It shows that Borel games of length ω2 are determined if, and only
if, those in a much more complicated class of games of length ω are. Recall the
definition of Go¨del’s constructible hierarchy over R: L0(R) is Vω+1 (the collection
of all sets of von Neumann rank ≤ω), Lα+1(R) is the collection of all sets definable
over Lα(R) from parameters in Lα(R), and Lλ(R) =
⋃
α<λ Lα(R) if λ is a limit
ordinal.
1In the interest of expedience, one may define the statement “there are infinitely many Woodin
cardinals” to mean the following in ZC: there is an infinite sequence (δ0, δ1, . . .) of cardinals such
that for each i ∈ N, Vδi is a model of ZFC and δi is a Woodin cardinal in Vδj whenever i < j.
2It suffices to assume that ϑα exists for all α < ω1 (see below).
4 J. P. AGUILERA
Theorem 1.5. Let ϑ be the least ordinal such that for every countable ordinal α,
there is ξ < ϑ such that Lξ(R) satisfies “Vα exists.” The following are equivalent:
(1) Borel determinacy for games of length ω2;
(2) Lϑ(R) is a model of the Axiom of Determinacy.
It is independent of ZFC whether Lϑ(R) is a model of the Axiom of Determinacy
or of the Axiom of Choice (or neither), but it is never a model of Zermelo set theory,
since P(R) ∩ Lϑ(R) 6∈ Lϑ(R).
The use of large cardinals is essential in proofs of determinacy by Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem, for one can often prove the existence of inner models of
set theory satisfying forms of the axiom of infinity from the determinacy of infinite
games. Results of this form include Friedman’s Theorem 1.2 and Theorem 1.3, but
also Harrington’s [Ha78] work on analytic determinacy and Woodin’s work in pro-
jective determinacy and the Axiom of Determinacy (see e.g., [MSW] and [KW10]).
More recent work in this direction includes that of Steel [St], Montalba´n-Shore
[MoSh11], Welch [We11], Trang [Tr13], and others. In order to obtain equivalences
such as Theorem 1.3, as opposed to equiconsistency results, one needs to involve the
techniques of the core model induction. Since we shall be confined within L(R), the
arguments we will need can be found in Steel-Woodin [StW16]. Other expositions
include Schindler-Steel [SchSt] and Wilson [Wi12].
The determinacy of games of countable length with analytic (or projective) payoff
has been proved by Neeman [Ne04] from assumptions that are very likely optimal.
The optimality for games of sufficiently closed length has been verified by Trang
[Tr13] and by Woodin, in unpublished work. Reversals of determinacy hypotheses
for projective games of length ω2 were obtained in [AgMu] and for clopen games in
[Ag18a]. Games of length ω2 were first considered in print by Blass [Bl75]. Let us
finish this introduction with some open questions:
Question 1.6. Is the equivalence in Theorem 1.3 provable within ZC?
Question 1.7. What is the consistency strength of Borel determinacy for games
of length ω2 + ω?
Question 1.8. What is the consistency strength of determinacy for games of length
ω with payoff in the smallest σ-algebra containing the projective sets?
——
The article is structured as follows: Theorem 1.5 is proved in Section 3. The
proof is purely descriptive-set– and recursion-theoretic. It involves the use of
model games which incorporate elements from the constructions in Martin and
Steel [MaSt08], Friedman [Fr71], and Martin (see [Ma]). A tool used in the proof
(Lemma 3.1) is a method of describing initial segments of the L(R)-hierarchy
by games in which two players determine the truth of a statement in L(R) by
challenging each other’s claims with auxiliary games. This lemma is proved in
Section 4. The article ends with Section 5, in which localizations of arguments
from inner model theory are shown to imply Theorem 1.3, starting from Theorem
1.5.
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank Sandra Mu¨ller, Grigor Sargsyan, and
Hugh Woodin for engaging in fruitful discussions with us. This work was partially
suported by a grant from the Austrian Science Fund.
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2. Preliminaries
We shall use notions from descriptive set theory and ordinal recursion theory
freely. We refer the reader to Moschovakis’ book [Mo09] and to Barwise’s book
[Ba75] for background. Additional background, as well as history, can be found
in the chapters from the Handbook of Set Theory by Schindler-Zeman [SchZe10],
Steel [St10], and Koellner-Woodin [KW10].
Our notation is standard. Among the usual abuses of notation in which we
shall engage are the identification of R with the Baire space NN, as well as the
identification of Gale-Stewart games with other infinite zero-sum games without
explicitly transforming the payoff set into that of a Gale-Stewart game. We also
identify R with Vω+1. In particular, natural numbers are real numbers.
If σ is a strategy for a short game (i.e., one of length ω) on N, then we may
alternately regard σ as a real, as a function on NN, or as the function on R which
to each x ∈ R assigns the unique y which results by playing against x in a way
consistent with σ. If σ and τ are two strategies, σ ∗ τ denotes the result of facing
them off against each other.
We will often need to consider games of length ω with moves in R. These can
be considered as games of length ω2 on N in which Player I’s moves are ignored
throughout the (2n+1)th block of ω-many moves, and Player II’s moves are ignored
throughout the (2n)th block of ω-many moves. In particular, if Borel games of
length ω2 are determined, then so too are Borel games of length ω with moves on
R; the converse is not true, as the latter statement is provable in ZFC (by Martin’s
proof of Borel determinacy).
At no point other than Section 5 will we need any inner model theory, but we
will make use of simple fine-structural facts about L(R). We make use of the Jensen
hierarchy over the reals (see [Je72]). Recall its definition given by:
J0(R) = Vω+1
Jα+1(R) = closure of Jα(R) ∪ {Jα(R)} under rudimentary functions
Jλ(R) =
⋃
α<λ
Jα(R), for limit λ.
The following definition is perhaps not standard, but will suffice for our purposes:
Definition 2.1. Let α and β be ordinals. We say that the projectum of Jα(R) is
Vβ if β < α and β is the least ordinal such that
Vβ+1 ∩
(
Jα+1(R) \ Jα(R)
)
6= ∅.
Let β be such that Vβ is the projectum of Jα(R). We say that Jα(R) projects
to Vβ . Since R always belongs to Jα(R), β is at least ω + 1. If β = ω + 1, we say
that Jα(R) projects to R. If Jα(R) does not project to R, then every subset of R
definable over P(R)Jα(R) belongs to Jα(R), so(
N,R,P(R) ∩ Jα(R)
)
is a model of third-order arithmetic.
If the projectum of Jα(R) is not defined, then Jα(R) contains all definable subsets
of V
Jα(R)
β for all β < α, and so
Jα(R) |= ZF.
6 J. P. AGUILERA
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that the projectum of Jα(R) is Vβ and ω+1 < β. Then,
there is a surjection
ρ : Vβ ∩ Jα(R)։ Jα(R)
in Jα+1(R).
Proof. This proof is similar to those in [Je72, Section 3] and [St08, Section 1].
Suppose that the projectum of Lα(R) is Vβ , with ω+1 < β, and let φ be a formula
in the language of set theory such that for some a ∈ Jα(R), we have{
x ∈ Jα(R) : Jα(R) |= φ(a, x)
}
∈ Vβ+1 ∩
(
Jα+1(R) \ Jα(R)
)
.
Call the set just defined A. Suppose that φ is Σn. In L(R), every set is definable
from a real and ordinal parameters, in fact, by Lemma 1.4 of [St08], there are
surjections
fβ : [ω · β]
<ω × R։ Jβ(R)
which are uniformly Σ1 over Jβ(R). Thus, we may assume that a ∈ R by replacing
n with a bigger natural number if necessary, and replacing φ(a, x) with the formula
φ(fα(~β, a), x) holds for the least tuple ~β such that the set{
x : φ(fα(~β, a), x)
}
does not exist.
Since ω + 1 < β, Lemma 1.7 and Theorem 1.16 of [St08] imply that Jα(R) has
a Σn Skolem function, i.e., that there is a partial map
h : Jα(R)× R→ Jα(R)
which is Σn in a parameter p ∈ Jα(R) such that whenever S is a nonempty Σn set
over Jα(R) with a parameter q ∈ Jα(R), then
h(q, x) ∈ S for some x ∈ R.
Thus, one can define the Σn Skolem hull of Jα(R) with a Σn formula using param-
eters from Jα(R). Let p be the parameter defining h and
H = Hull
Jα(R)
Σn
(Vβ ∩ Jα(R), {p}).
By Lemma 1.9 of [St08],
(1) H is a Σn-elementary substructure of Jα(R), and
(2) H = f [X<ω] for some partial map f which is Σn over H with parameters
in H, where X = (Vβ ∩ Jα(R)) ∪ {p}.
The latter conclusion easily implies that in fact
H = f [X<ω]
for some partial map f as above, where X = Vβ ∩ Jα(R).
Since ω + 1 < β, H contains all reals, so, by condensation, there is γ ≤ α such
that the transitive collapse of H is Jγ(R). Let
π : Jγ(R)։ H
be the collapse embedding, which has critical point ≥β. By definition, A ∈ Vβ+1,
so
if Jα(R) |= φ(a, x), then x ∈ Vβ .
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Since Vβ ∩ Jα(R) ⊂ Jγ(R) and a ∈ R, we have for every x ∈ Jγ(R),
Jα(R) |= φ(a, x) if, and only if, Jα(R) |= x ∈ Vπ(β) ∧ φ(a, x),
if, and only if, Jγ(R) |= x ∈ Vβ ∧ φ(a, x).
This is not entirely straightforward, as Vβ ∩Jα(R) need not be an element of Jγ(R)
(or of Jα(R)), but for each η, the set{
x ∈ Jη(R) : x has rank β
}
is uniformly ∆
Jη(R)
1 (β) (provided β < η). Thus, the set A is definable over Jγ(R),
which implies that γ = α. Using π and the function f from above, one obtains a
partial surjection from Vβ ∩ Jα(R) onto Jα(R) which is definable over Jα(R) by a
Σn formula with parameters. This easily translates into a Πn+1 (with parameters)
total surjection f∗ from Vβ ∩ Jα(R) onto Jα(R). Clearly f
∗ belongs to Jα+1(R),
which completes the proof. 
3. Determinacy and L(R)
If A ⊂ R× R is a set and x ∈ R, we define Ax = {y ∈ R : (x, y) ∈ A} and
aRA =
{
x ∈ R : Player I has a winning strategy in the game
with payoff Ax and moves in R
}
.
The set aRA is defined similarly for A a subset of other spaces, such as Rn. Letting
aR∆11 = {a
RA : A is Borel}, we write
γ11 = sup{α : there is a prewellordering of R in a
R∆11 of rank α}.
The ordinal γ11 is usually denoted by δaR∆11 .
3
Lemma 3.1. P(R) ∩ Lγ11 (R) ⊂ a
R∆11.
The proof of Lemma 3.1 will be delegated to the following section. For now, let
us assume that it is true.
Remark 3.2. Under determinacy, Lemma 3.1 can be proved easily by appealing to
general Wadge theory. The proof that we shall provide, however, is direct, and goes
through in e.g., ZF+ DC.
Definition 3.3. We denote by ϑα the least ordinal ξ such that Lξ(R) is a model
of
KP+ Separation + “Vα exists.”
We also define
ϑ = sup
α<ω1
ϑα.
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 3.4. The following are equivalent:
(1) Borel determinacy for games of length ω2;
(2) Lϑ(R) |= AD.
3Note that aR∆11 is a much smaller class than ∆
L(R)
1 = ∆aRΠ11
, the class of all sets A such
that both A and its complement belong to aRΠ11.
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We need some preliminaries. We will work with structures in the language of
set theory with additional constants {x˙i : i ∈ N} (which will be interpreted as real
numbers). We fix:
(1) a formula θ(·, ·, ·) in the language of set theory defining in L(R) an R-
parametrized sequence of wellorderings the union of whose domain is L(R)
(e.g., the one given by Lemma 1.4 of [St08]), and
(2) injective functions n(·) and m(·) assigning natural numbers to formulae in
the extended language in such a way that their ranges are recursive and
disjoint and whenever x˙i occurs in a formula φ, then i < m(φ) and i < n(φ).
Let us begin with an observation:
Lemma 3.5. Suppose that M is a model of KP and M contains an ordinal a
isomorphic to α. Then (Va)
M (which need not belong to M) is wellfounded.
Proof. Let us identify the wellfounded part of M with its transitive collapse. In
particular, we write α for the ordinal a in the statement of the lemma. Although
(Vα)
M need not belong toM , it is ∆1-definable (with parameters) overM , so given
x ∈ (Vα)
M , M can determine the rank of x. Thus, if x ∈M y and y ∈M (Vα)
M ,
then
rankM (x) < rankM (y) < α.
Since α is wellfounded, (Vα)
M must be too. 
Lemma 3.6. For every α < ω1, let Tα be the set of all (real numbers coding)
complete and consistent theories T in the language of set theory with additional
constants {x˙i : i ∈ N} such that
(1) T extends KP+ “R exists”+ V = L(R) + {x˙i ∈ R : i ∈ N},
(2) T contains Skolem schemata of the forms
∃x ∈ Rφ(x)→ φ(x˙n(φ)),
∃xφ(x)→ ∃x∃β ∈ Ord (θ(β, x˙m(φ), x) ∧ φ(x));
(3) all models of T contain an ordinal isomorphic to α.
Then Tα is a Borel subset of R.
Proof. Given a complete and consistent theory T in the language of set theory
extending KP, we say that M is a term model of T if M is the natural =-quotient
of the collection of all formulae φ with one free variable such that
“there is a unique x satisfying φ(x)” ∈ T,
with the membership predicate and the constants x˙i having the obvious interpre-
tations. Suppose that T is as in the statement of the lemma and let M be the
term model of T . It follows from the Tarski-Vaught criterion and the fact that M
satisfies the Skolem schemata that M is in fact a model of T . Moreover, it embeds
into every model of T , so every model of T contains an isomorphic copy of α + 1
if, and only if, M does.
Fix some wellordering  of N of length α+1. Thus, the following are equivalent:
(1) T ∈ Tα;
(2) there is a term model M of T , and a function f such that
(a) the range of f is the field of ,
(b) the domain of f is the set of ∈M -predecessors of an ordinal of M ,
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(c) for all y ∈ dom(f), f(y) is the -least number greater than f(x) for
every x ∈M y;
(3) for all term models M of T , there is an M -ordinal m ∈M such that for all
functions f , if
(a) the range of f is contained in the field of ,
(b) the domain of f is the set of ∈M -predecessors of (m+ 1)M ,
(c) for all y ∈ dom(f), f(y) is the -least number greater than f(x) for
every x ∈M y,
then f(m) is the -largest number.
Therefore Tα is Borel. 
Lemma 3.7. ϑ is least such that
Lϑ(R) |= “Borel games on R are determined.”
Proof. Clearly ϑ has this property, for Lϑ(R) has initial segments with enough
iterated powersets of the real numbers for Martin’s proof [Ma75] to go through;
moreover, the existence of winning strategies for games on R is upwards absolute
between transitive sets that contain R.
Let us verify that ϑ is the least such ordinal. We need to employ model games
such as the one of [MaSt08]. A similar application of the techniques of [MaSt08]
was used in [AgMu] to produce iterable models of AD with Woodin cardinals.
Fortunately, our situation is simpler inasmuch as we do not need to construct
models with large cardinals (yet); the drawback is that we cannot even ask for
wellfoundedness in the payoff. One deals with this issue as in Martin’s reversal of
Borel determinacy (unpublished, but see the exercise in pp. 53–54 of [Ma] for the
case of Π04 games on N).
Let α < ω1 be an infinite successor ordinal. We consider the following game:
I x0, u0 x2, u1 . . .
II x1, v0 x3, v1 . . .
Here, Players I and II play a countable sequence of reals {xi}i∈N, as well as two
countable sequences u, v ∈ 2N. Fix an enumeration {φi : i ∈ N} of all formulae in
the language of set theory with added constants {x˙i :∈ N}. We ask of the players
that:
(1) TI := {φi : ui = 1} is a complete, consistent theory in the expanded
language, satisfying the following conditions:
(a) TI extends the theory KP + Separation + “R exists” + DC + V =
L(R);
(b) TI contains the statement x˙i ∈ R for each i ∈ N, and it contains the
statement x˙i(n) = m if, and only if, xi(n) = m;
(c) TI contains the Skolem schemata
∃x ∈ Rφ(x)→ φ(x˙n(φ)),
∃xφ(x)→ ∃x∃β ∈ Ord (θ(β, x˙m(φ), x) ∧ φ(x));
(d) We ask that all models of TI contain an ordinal isomorphic to α. If
so, then by the proof of Lemma 3.6, there must be a formula φα in the
expanded language that defines the αth ordinal in every model of TI .
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We demand then that TI contain the axiom
“if φα(x) holds, then Vx exists,”
as well as
φα(x) ∧ φ(a)→ La(R) 6|= KP + Separation + “Vx exists,”
whenever φ is a formula and the formula “the unique a satisfying φ(a)
is an ordinal smaller than α” belongs to TI .
(2) TII := {φi : vi = 1} is a complete, consistent theory in the expanded
language with the same requirements as above.
If TI satisfies the properties above and M is a model of TI , then the definable
closure of {xMi : i ∈ N} in M is an elementary substructure of M isomorphic to
the term model of TI . Denote this model by NI . In particular, NI satisfies KP +
Separation + “Vα exists” and no proper initial segment of NI does. Similarly for
Player II. If the above conditions are met, Player I wins if, and only if, one of the
following holds:
(1) NI is isomorphic to an initial segment of NII ; or
(2) there is an ordinal a of NI such that La(R)
NI is isomorphic to an initial
segment of NII , but La+1(R)
NI is not.
In either clause, we do not demand that the initial segment of NII be an element
of NII .
Sublemma 3.8. The winning condition is Borel.
Proof. Let us momentarily reason in
KP+ Separation + “R exists” + DC+ V = L(R).
Suppose that Jξ(R) 6|=“Vα exists,” for every ordinal ξ. Thus, for every ξ, the
projectum of Jξ(R) is strictly smaller than Vα. By Proposition 2.2, whenever ξ is
an ordinal, there is some
a ∈ Vα ∩ Jξ+1(R)
such that a codes Jξ(R). Now, let NI and NII be as in the definition of the game
(i.e., suppose that TI and TII satisfy the conditions necessary in order for NI and
NII to be defined). Now, NI and NII might have initial segments that satisfy
“Vα exists,” but they certainly do not have any initial segments satisfying “Vα+1
exists,” so for every initial segment N of either of NI or NII of (internal) limit
length greater than α, we have
for all ξ ∈ OrdN , there is a ∈ (Vα+1)
N coding (Jξ(R))
N .
(One could easily get around this issue by removing the condition that the theories
satisfy KP + Separation, but we have adpoted the rule because this is the theory
used in the definition of ϑα.)
Back in the real world, we verify that conditions (1) and (2) are Borel. We
will show that it is Borel to check whether the elements of (Vα)
NI are (up to
isomorphism) those of (Vα)
N , for some initial segment N of (Vα)
NII . This suffices
for (1), by the above remark and by replacing α with α + 1. As in the proof of
Proposition 2.2, one should bear in mind that (Vα)
N need not be an element of N ,
but it is definable over N in a Borel way by defining an initial segment of the rank
function along a Borel presentation of α; viz., a set x ∈ N has rank α in N if, and
only if, f(x) = α for some (all) function(s) f such that
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(1) the range of f is α+ 1,
(2) the domain of f is a subset of N containing x and is transitive (so, in
particular, ∈N is wellfounded in dom(f)),
(3) for all y ∈ dom(f), f(y) = sup{f(z) : z ∈N y}.
Let fI (in V ) be a function assigning to each set in (Vα)
NI its rank in NI and
fII be defined similarly. Consider the following Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´–like game:
(1) Player II begins by selecting an ordinal a ∈ NII . Define N = (Ja(R))
NII .
For the rest of the game, the players attempt to determine whether (Vα)
NI
is equal to (Vα)
N up to isomorphism.
(2) During turn 1, Player I selects some x0 ∈ (Vα)
NI or some y0 ∈ (Vα)
N . In
the first case, let ξ0 be least such that x0 ∈ (Vξ0 )
NI ; Player II needs to
respond with some y0 ∈ (Vξ0)
N . In the second case, let ξ0 be least such
that y0 ∈ (Vξ0)
N ; Player II needs to respond with some x0 ∈ (Vξ0)
NI .
(3) During turn n+1, assuming xn, yn, and ξn have been defined, Player I plays
some ξn+1 < ξn and either some xn+1 ∈ (Vξn+1)
NI such that xn+1 ∈
NI xn
or some yn+1 ∈ (Vξn+1)
N such that yn+1 ∈
NII yn. In the first case, Player
II must respond with some yn+1 ∈ (Vξn+1)
N such that yn+1 ∈
NII yn; in the
second case, Player II must respond with some xn+1 ∈ (Vξn+1)
NI such that
xn+1 ∈
NI xn.
(4) The first player who cannot make a legal move loses the game.
This game can easily be coded by a clopen game of length ω on N with parameters
α, NI , NII , fI , and fII ; let us denote it by EF0(NI , NII , fI , fII) to emphasize this.
If there is an ordinal a ∈ NII such that (Vα)
NI = (Vα)
Ja(R)
NII , then clearly Player
II has a winning strategy. Moreover, if there is no such ordinal, then one can
easily use the fact that (Vα)
NI and (Vα)
NII are wellfounded to construct a winning
strategy for Player I.
There is a problem with this game, viz., that one may also want to consider
initial segments of NII not of the form Ja(R) for a an ordinal of NII . For this,
we define a game EF (NI , NII , fI , fII) which is like EF0(NI , NII , fI , fII), except
that Player I begins by selecting an ordinal a0 of NI , after which Player II selects
a ∈ NII and they continue as before to determine whether
(Vα)
Ja0 (R)
NI
= (Vα)
Ja(R)
NII
.
An argument like the preceding one shows that Player II has a winning strategy in
EF (NI , NII , fI , fII) if, and only if, (Vα)
NI = (Vα)
N for some initial segment N of
NII .
Now, one sees that the following are equivalent:
(1) the elements of (Vα)
NI are those of (Vα)
N , for some initial segment N of
(Vα)
NII ,
(2) there is sequence of surjective functions {fβ : β ≤ α} and an initial segment
N of NII such that, identifying the wellfounded parts of NI and N with
their transitive collapses,
(a) f0 maps the empty set to the empty set,
(b) for all β ≤ α, fβ+1 : (Vβ)
NI → (Vβ)
N maps each set b to the set
{fβ(a) : a ∈
NI b}, in the sense of N ,
(c) for all limit β ≤ α, fβ =
⋃
γ<β fγ
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(3) for every pair of functions fI and fII assigning respectively to each set
in (Vα)
NI and (Vα)
NII its rank in NI and NII , Player I does not have a
winning strategy in the game EF (NI , NII , fI , fII).
Since EF (NI , NII , fI , fII) is a clopen game, Player I not having a winning strategy
is a Π11 condition. It follows that condition (1) is Borel.
Similarly, to prove that (2) is Borel, it suffices to show that it is Borel to check
whether there is a ∈ NI such that
(1) (Vα)
Ja(R)
NI ⊂ (Vα)
NII
(2) (Vα)
Ja+1(R)
NI
6⊂ (Vα)
NII
An argument as above shows that the conjunction of these two statements is Borel.
This proves the sublemma. 
We have shown that the payoff set of the game is Borel. Moreover, it is easily
won by Player I in V , for she can play the theory of Jϑα(R) = Lϑα(R) and, e.g.,
only recursive reals. Recall that ϑα is least such that
Jϑα(R) |= KP + Separation + “Vα exists.”
Moreover, as long as Player II plays by copying the theory chosen by Player I
(and plays arbitrary reals), then every strategy that ensures that Player I will win
demands that she play the theory of Jϑα(R). Thus, the theory of Jϑα(R) can be
easily computed from R and any winning strategy for Player I.
Now let ξ be an ordinal such that the game is determined in Jξ(R). Then Jξ(R)
contains a winning strategy τ for some player. Since Jξ(R) contains all plays of
the game, τ is also a winning strategy in V , so it must be a winning strategy for
Player I. Hence, we must have ϑα < ξ, since τ cannot belong to Jϑα(R). Therefore,
if Jξ(R) contains strategies for the game above for each α < ω1, then it contains
every ordinal below ϑ, which is what was to be shown. 
Lemma 3.9. Let ξ < ϑ. Then there is a prewellordering of R of length greater
than ξ definable by a set in aR∆11.
Proof. Choose α < ω1 such that ξ < ϑα and let (i, x), (j, y) be two pairs in N× R.
The ordinal ϑα will play no role in the game other than bounding the complexity
of the payoff set. We consider a two-player game G(α, i, x, j, y) given by
I x0, u0 x2, u1 . . .
II x1, v0 x3, v1 . . .
I y1, t0 y3, t1 . . .
II y0, s0 y2, s1 . . .
Here, I and II play two runs of the game from Lemma 3.7 in parallel, except
that their roles are reversed in the second game. As before, we suppose fixed an
enumeration {φi : i ∈ N} of all formulae in the language of set theory with added
constants {x˙i : i ∈ N}. The rules are:
(1) If φj is not a formula with one free variable and with no constant symbols
other than x˙0, then Player II loses.
(2) If φi is not a formula with one free variable and with no constant symbols
other than x˙0, then Player I loses.
(3) Both players have to obey the rules in each subgame.
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(4) If so, then Player II has to win the second subgame. Moreover, she must set
y0 = y and the theory played must contain the formula “there is a unique
ordinal satisfying φj .”
(5) If so, then Player I has to win the first subgame. Moreover, she must set
x0 = x and the theory played must contain the formula “there is a unique
ordinal satisfying φi.”
If all rules thus far have been obeyed, then we declare the winner according to the
following rules (here, we identify the theories played with their term models):
(1) Every real played in the first subgame must be played in the second subgame
by Player II; otherwise, Player I wins.
(2) Every real played in the second subgame must be played in the first subgame
by Player I; otherwise, Player II wins.
(3) If no winner has been declared thus far, let NI be the winning model from
the first subgame and NII be the winning model from the second subgame
(both with α in their wellfounded parts). Then,
(a) We demand that NI be isomorphic to an initial segment of NII ; oth-
erwise, Player II wins.
(b) Let aI be the unique ordinal in NI satisfying φi and let aII be the
unique ordinal in NII satisfying φj . Then, Player I wins if for every
(some) isomorphism j from NI to an initial segment N of NII , we
have
NII |= j(aI) < aII .
If not, then Player II wins.
Let ϑ∗α be the order-type of the set of ordinals definable in Lϑα(R) from a real.
Given pairs (i, x), (j, y) as above, if there is not a unique ordinal η < ϑα such that
Lϑα(R) |= φj(y, η),
then Player I has a winning strategy in the game obtained by playing the theory of
Lϑα(R) in both subgames. This way, Player I is guaranteed to win the first subgame
and Player II is forced to play the theory of Lϑα(R) in the second subgame, which
will cost her the game. Similarly, if η above exists and there is not a unique ordinal
γ < ϑα such that
Lϑα(R) |= φi(x, γ),
then Player II has a winning strategy in the game. Otherwise, let γ and η be as
above. We claim that
(1) γ ≤ η if, and only if, Player I has a winning strategy in the game.
If so, then the game defines a prewellordering of R of length greater than ϑ∗α, in
which the pairs of highest rank are those whose first coordinate fails the syntactic
condition (1)–(2) and the pairs of second-highest rank are those not defining an
ordinal in Lϑα(R), i.e., those failing conditions (4)–(5). The facts that condition
(1) is checked before condition (2) and that condition (4) is checked before (5) will
ensure that the game defines a reflexive relation. Let us now proceed to the proof
of equation (1).
Suppose γ ≤ η. A winning strategy for Player I is defined by setting x0 = x as
appropriate and playing the theory of Lϑα(R) in the first subgame together with all
reals played in the second subgame. In the second subgame, Player I also plays the
theory of Lϑα(R). This strategy ensures that Player I will win the first subgame,
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as in Lemma 3.7. Moreover, if Player II wishes to have any chance of winning the
second subgame, she must also play the theory of Lϑα(R). If so, then this will define
two models NI and NII as in the rules of the game, both wellfounded. Either there
will be a real played in the first game and not in the second—in which case Player
I wins—or both plays will contain the same reals. If so, the models NI and NII
both embed into Lϑα(R) and are hence wellfounded, so their transitive collapses
are of the forms LαI (σ) and LαII (σ), for some countable set of reals σ. Since each
model satisfies the formulae:
(1) KP + Separation,
(2) “Vα exists,” and
(3) “for all η ∈ Ord, Lη(R) 6|= KP + Separation + ‘Vα exists,’ ”
they must be equal. If Player II has not lost at this point, then we must have
y0 = y. The fact that LαI (σ) embeds elementarily into Lϑα(R) implies that the
ordinal defined by φi and x must be at most the ordinal defined by φj and y in
those models, as desired.
Conversely, suppose that Player I has a winning strategy in the game. We
consider a run of the game by that strategy in which Player II plays the theory of
Lϑα(R) in the first subgame, as well as in the second, where she also plays all reals
from the first subgame. This ensures winning the second subgame and losing the
first one. As before, this forces Player I to play the theory of Lϑα(R) in the first
game, so the play defines two wellfounded models with the same reals and the same
theory, whose transitive collapses must therefore be equal. Since the play must
be won by Player I, the ordinal defined by φi and x must be at most the ordinal
defined by φj and y.
This proves the claim and, together with the remark following equation (1) shows
that the relation  given by
(i, x)  (j, y) if, and only if, Player I has a winning strategy in G(α, i, x, j, y)
is a prewellordering of length greater than ϑ∗α. A standard Skolem-hull argument
shows that if β < α, then ϑβ < ϑ
∗
α. Using the fact that the game from Lemma 3.7
is Borel, one sees that for every α, G(α, i, x, j, y) is uniformly in ∆11(α, 〈i, x〉, 〈j, y〉),
which completes the proof. 
Before proving the theorem, we need two more lemmata.
Lemma 3.10. Let ω + 1 < α < ω1. The pointclass (Σ
2
1)
Lϑα (R) has the scale
property.
Proof. Let γ = ϑα. Since Lγ(R) is a model of Σ1-separation, γ is R-nonprojectible,
in the sense that there is no total function which is (Σ1)
Lγ(R) with parameters in
Lγ(R) and which maps γ injectively into some β < γ. The usual argument for L
(see Barwise [Ba75, Theorem 6.8]) shows that γ is recursively R-inaccessible, i.e.,
R-admissible and a limit of R-admissibles.
To prove the lemma, we first verify that the proof of Martin-Steel [MaSt08,
Lemma 1] goes through in Lγ(R) and shows that every (a
RΠ11)
Lγ(R) set4 admits
a closed game representation in Lγ(R). To see this, first observe that every well-
founded tree T in Lγ(R) has a rank, since γ is a limit of R-admissibles. This
observation ensures that the proof of the claim in the proof of [MaSt08, Lemma 1]
4In the choiceless context, aR is to be understood in terms of quasi-strategies.
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holds in Lγ(R) so that (using the notation from [MaSt08]) Player I has a winning
strategy in Gx if, and only if, she has one in G
∗
x,ξ for some ξ. Now, each G
∗
x,ξ is a
closed game and G∗x,ξ ∈ Lξ+1(R). By standard arguments, if Player I has a winning
strategy in G∗x,ξ, she has one in Lξ∗+1(R) whenever ξ < ξ
∗ and ξ∗ is R-admissible.
Clearly, ΘLγ(R) is also recursively R-inaccessible and, by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
theorem,
LΘLγ(R)(R) ≺1 Lγ(R),
so it follows that if x ∈ R and ξ is least such that Player I has a winning strategy
in G∗x,ξ, then
ξ < ΘLγ(R).
Denote this least ξ by ξx and let λ be the supremum of all ξx such that ξx is
defined; thus, λ ≤ ΘLγ(R). This shows that the map x 7→ G∗x,λ belongs to Lγ(R).
One finishes the argument as in [MaSt08, Lemma 1].
The statement of [MaSt08, Lemma 3] also holds true in Lγ(R), i.e.,
(aRΠ11)
Lγ(R) = Σ1(Lγ(R), {R}).
Here, the proof needs no modifications other than weakening condition (2) to only
require that the model satisfy (say) KP, as opposed to ZF−. This shows, using the
proof of [MaSt08, Theorem 4], that the pointclass
Σ1(Lγ(R), {R})
has the scale property. Now the proof of Solovay’s basis theorem (e.g., the one in
Section 2 of Koellner-Woodin [KW10], replacing their T0 with some strong-enough
theory that holds in LΘLγ (R)(R)) shows that
Σ1(Lγ(R), {R}) = (Σ
2
1)
Lγ(R),
from which the lemma follows. 
Lemma 3.11. Suppose that sets in aR∆11 are determined. Then, Borel games of
length ω2 are determined.
Proof. This argument is a local version of the one in Blass [Bl75]. Consider the
game on R of length ω in which two players alternate turns playing strategies for
games of length ω:
I σ0 σ1 . . .
II τ0 τ1 . . .
Player I wins if, and only if,
(σ0 ∗ τ0, σ1 ∗ τ1, . . .) ∈ A,
where σ ∗ τ denotes the result of playing the strategies σ and τ against each other.
Call this game G. It is a Borel game (on R), so it is determined. If it is Player
I who wins this game, then Player I also wins the game of length ω2 with payoff
A. Suppose that it is Player II who wins this game; we shall construct a winning
strategy for the game of length ω2 with payoff A for Player II.
Let Σ denote the winning strategy for Player II in G. Σ is essentially a set of
reals. By the remark at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 3.7, we may assume
Σ ∈ Lϑ(R).
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Recall that ϑ = sup{ϑα : α < ω1}. By the minimality of ϑα and the R-stability of
δ21 , we have
ϑα < (δ
2
1)
ϑα+1
for each α < ω1. This implies by Lemma 3.10 that P(R) ∩ Lϑ(R) has the scale
property. Since it is closed under quantification by R, Theorem D of [Mo71] implies
that it has the uniformization property.
Denote by A∗ the set of all sequences p of natural numbers of length ω · n, for
some n ∈ N, such that there is a sequence
~τ ∈ Rn
such that p results from applying Σ to ~τ . Put
A∗n = A
∗ ∩Rn.
For any given p ∈ A∗1, there might be many strategies τ for Player I witnessing
p ∈ A∗; however, A∗1 is definable from Σ, so it belongs to Lϑ(R). Applying the
uniformization property, one finds a function
f1 : A
∗
1 → R
such that for each p ∈ A∗1, f1(p) is a strategy τ witnessing p ∈ A
∗ and, moreover,
f1 ∈ Lϑ(R). Inductively, suppose fn has been defined. For any given p ∈ A
∗
n+1,
there might be many strategies τ such that fn(p ↾ ω · n)
⌢τ witnesses p ∈ A∗, or
none at all; however, A∗n+1 is definable from Σ, so it belongs to Lϑ(R). Applying
the uniformization property, one finds a function
fn+1 : A
∗
n+1 → R
n+1
with fn+1 ∈ Lϑ(R) and such that the following hold for each p ∈ A
∗
n+1 for which
such a τ exists:
(1) fn+1(p) is a sequence ~τ witnessing p ∈ A
∗; and
(2) fn+1(p) ↾ m = fm(p ↾ ω ·m) for every m ≤ n+ 1.
Let us also define a partial function fω : R
N → RN by
fω(p) =
⋃
n∈N
fn(p ↾ n),
if the right-hand side is defined, and put
f =
⋃
n≤ω
fn.
Let us call a sequence p of natural numbers of length ω ·n, with n ∈ N, promising
if for every m ≤ n, p ↾ ω · m ∈ A∗ and this is witnessed by f(p) ↾ m. Given a
promising sequence p, we shall construct a strategy σ∗ for Player II (for a game
of length ω on N) such that for every x ∈ R, p⌢(σ∗(x)) is promising. Thus, if p∗
is a run of a game of length ω2 all of whose initial segments of limit length were
obtained in this way, then it is a play all of whose initial segments are promising.
This means that
p∗ = f(p∗) ∗ Σ
(
f(p∗)
)
,
which implies that p∗ ∈ A.
Now, let p ∈ Rn be promising and consider the game G∗ on N of length ω:
I x(0) x(2) . . .
II x(1) x(3) . . .
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Player II wins if, and only if, p⌢x is promising. We first show that Player I cannot
have a winning strategy. Suppose towards a contradiction that τ is a winning
strategy for Player I. Thus, if Player I begins a run of G by playing
f(p)⌢τ,
during the first n+1 moves and Player II plays by Σ, then she will begin by respond-
ing with n moves according to Σ, resulting in a sequence of strategies σ0, . . . , σn−1
so that
p =
(
f(p)(0) ∗ σ0, . . . , f(p)(n− 1) ∗ σn−1
)
and continue responding with one last move by Σ, say σ. Put x = τ ∗ σ. Since the
play of G just described is consistent with Σ, we have p⌢x ∈ A∗. Although it need
not be the case that f(p⌢x)(n) = τ , the construction of f ensures that f(p⌢x) is
a sequence ~τ witnessing p⌢x ∈ A∗ and f(p⌢x) ↾ n = f(p). Thus, the run of G∗
in which Player I plays by τ and Player II plays by σ results in a play x such that
p⌢x is promising, which is a contradiction. Hence, Player I cannot have a winning
strategy in G∗. We will show that the payoff set of G∗ belongs to aR∆11; this will
imply that it is determined and thus that Player II has a winning strategy, which
will finish the proof.
The payoff set of G∗ (for Player II) consists of all x ∈ R such that p⌢x is
promising. A sequence being promising is defined in terms of Σ and f . Now, each
fn belongs to Lϑ(R) and, since
cof (ϑ) = ω1,
there is some α < ω1 such that each fn belongs to Lϑα(R). Since(
L
ΘLϑα (R)
(R)
)ω
⊂ Lϑα(R),
we have f ∈ Lϑα(R). By choosing α large enough so that Σ ∈ Lϑα(R), we ensure
that {
p ∈ Rn : p is promising and n ∈ N
}
∈ Lϑα(R).
By Lemma 3.9, ϑ ≤ γ11 , so that, by Lemma, 3.1, the set in the displayed equation
belongs to aR∆11, which completes the proof. 
Woodin has shown that R♯ exists and AD holds in L(R) if, and only if, there is a
countably iterable proper-class model of ZFCwith infinitely manyWoodin cardinals.
Neeman [Ne04] has shown that if such a model exists, then all analytic games of
length ω2 are determined (incidentally, the converse follows from a theorem of
Trang [Tr13] and a theorem of Martin-Steel [MaSt08], after appealing to Woodin’s
theorem). Let us remark that the argument just given yields a direct proof of
analytic determinacy for games of length ω2 which involves no inner model theory.
Theorem 3.12. (Neeman-Woodin) Suppose that R♯ exists and L(R) |= AD. Then,
analytic games of length ω2 are determined.
Proof. Given an analytic set A, let G be the game defined as in the proof of Lemma
3.11. It is an analytic game on R and, if won by Player I, then the game of length
ω2 with payoff A is also won by Player I. Since R♯ exists, then analytic games on
R are determined, by the argument in Martin [Ma70], so if Player I does not win
A, then Player II does.
Since AD holds in L(R), all sets in aRΠ11 are determined. Moreover, the point-
class aRΠ11 is correctly computed in L(R), so if Player II wins an analytic game on
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R (this is a aRΠ11 fact), then she has a winning strategy which is (∆
2
1)
L(R). Hence,
the game G∗ defined as in the proof of the preceding lemma belongs to L(R) and
is thus determined. The rest of the argument is as before. 
Theorem 3.4 now follows: if Borel games of length ω2 are determined, then all
sets in aR∆11 are determined (in the usual sense). By Lemma 3.9, ϑ ≤ γ
1
1 , so
(2) Lϑ(R) |= AD
by Lemma 3.1. Conversely, suppose (2) holds. By Lemma 3.7 and the fact that
the existence of winning strategies for games on R is upwards absolute from initial
segments of L(R) (since they contain all possible plays of the game), we have
(3) aR∆11 ⊂ Lϑ(R).
Thus, sets in aR∆11 are determined (in the usual sense). By the previous lemma,
this implies that games of length ω2 with Borel payoff are determined. Theorem
3.4 is thus proved.
Corollary 3.13. γ11 = ϑ.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.9, and the observation that Lemma
3.7 implies equation (3). Note that the three lemmata were proved under no deter-
minacy hypotheses. 
4. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Let α < γ11 be an ordinal; we show
P(R) ∩ Lα+1(R) ⊂ a
R∆11.
The proof consists in defining a game that determines membership in a set defin-
able over Lα(R); we call it the definability game. Readers familiar with Tanaka’s
[Ta90] proof of Steel’s [St77] classical result on the equivalence between arithmetical
transfinite recursion and clopen determinacy should find similarities.
Fix some prewellordering  of R in aR∆11 of length α + 1 or greater. To ease
notation, assume that  is defined without real parameters. The definability game
will involve playing representations of elements of Lα(R). These are defined in-
ductively: pairs (0, x), where x ∈ R, are representations for x. Let β + 1 ≤ α,
b ∈ Lβ(R) and
B = {x ∈ Lβ(R) : Lβ(R) |= φˆ(x, b)}
be an element of Lβ+1(R). If xb codes a representation (ψ, y, yb) of b and |y| < β,
then the triple
(4) (φˆ, xβ , xb),
is a representation of B, whenever xβ is any real of rank β in .
5
Lemma 4.1. Let α and  be as above. Then, every set in Lα(R) has a represen-
tation.
Proof. By induction on ordinals β ≤ α. 
5Strictly speaking, we should allow xb to code finite tuples of representations, but we shall
generally abuse notation by assuming that these tuples have length 1.
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Let us also inductively define a proto-representation to be either a pair (0, x) as
above, or a triple as in (4) whose first coordinate is a formula and third coordinate is
a proto-representation, i.e., one drops the requirement on the -rank of the second
coordinate.
Being a proto-representation is easy to check—the class of all proto-
representations is Σ01. Being a genuine representation, on the other hand, is more
complicated, as, if (φˆ, xβ , xb) is as in (4), then one needs to check that xb in fact
codes a representation for an element of Lβ(R).
In principle, one can have highly inefficient representations in which one defines
simple objects in a complicated way. We will denote by Repα the set of codes of
all representations of the form (0, x) and of the form (φˆ, xβ , xb), where xβ has rank
<α in . Belonging to Repα does not guarantee that a representation is optimal,
but it guarantees that, in a sense, it is not “more complicated than α.”
Lemma 4.2. Let α < γ11 , , and Repα be as above. If xα has rank α in , then
Repα ∈ a
R∆11(xα).
Proof. It is easy to determine whether a real number codes a representation of the
form (0, y), so let us consider only proto-representations which are triples.
For a triple (ψ, x, y) to be a representation of an element of Lα(R) in Repα, it
is necessary and sufficient that the following two conditions hold:
(1) x ≺ xα,
(2) y codes a representation (ψˆ, xγ , xc) and xγ ≺ x.
Given a ∈ R, we define a game G(a) on reals with payoff in ∆11(xα). In this game,
Player I claims that a codes a representation, and Player II claims otherwise.
If a does not code a triple, the game ends immediately and Player I loses. Other-
wise, suppose a codes a triple (ψ, x, y) as above. Player II must begin by challenging
one of the two conditions (1) or (2) above. If Player II decides to challenge condition
(1), then they must play the game with payoff in ∆11(x, xα) determining whether
x ≺ xα;
if so, the winner of this subgame is the winner of G. If Player II decides to challenge
condition (2), then Player II must provide one of the following three reasons:
(1) y does not code a triple nor a pair (0, yˆ), where yˆ ∈ R;
(2) y codes a triple (ψˆ, xγ , xc), but x  xγ ;
(3) y codes a triple (ψˆ, xγ , xc), but xc is not a representation.
If Player II claims that y does not code a triple or a pair (0, yˆ), then the game
ends and Player I wins if, and only if, y codes a triple or a pair (0, yˆ). If Player
II claims that x  xγ , then, as above, they must play the game with payoff in
∆(x, xγ) determining whether
xγ ≺ x.
Finally, if Player II claims that y codes a triple (ψˆ, xγ , xc), but xc is not a repre-
sentation, then she again must provide a reason, and so on. If Player II correctly
identifies the problems with Player I’s purported representations throughout the
game, then she must initiate a subgame after finitely many turns (because ≺ is
wellfounded). Hence, we add as a rule that if the game finishes after infinitely
many turns without Player II having initiated a subgame, she loses. We note that,
although different subgames can be initiated by Player II, they are all Borel, and
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in fact they are so in a uniform way, i.e., they are all instances of the same game
(namely, the one for determining whether u ≺ v), and only their parameters vary.
This uniformity is necessary for ensuring that the payoff of G(a) is also Borel.
Now, Player I wins a run p of the game if, and only if, one of the following holds:
(1) One of the players violates a rule and the first one to do so is Player II;
(2) The players obey the rules and for all n, Player II does not initiate a
subgame in the nth turn;
(3) The players obey the rules, there is a least n such that Player II initiates a
subgame in the nth turn, and p ↾ (n,∞) is a win for Player I in this game.
The first condition is Σ01(a, p, xα), the second one is Π
0
1(a, p), and the third one is
∆11(a, p). Thus, the winning condition is in ∆
1
1(a, p, xα). Moreover, if (ψ, x, y) is a
representation of an element of Lα(R), then any challenge raised by Player II can
easily be overcome by Player I, so she must have a winning strategy. Similarly, if
(ψ, x, y) is not a representation of an element of Lα(R), then Player II can identify
the reason why this is the case and pose a challenge Player I cannot overcome.
Therefore, Player I has a winning strategy in this game if, and only if, a indeed
codes a representation of an element of Lα(R) in Repα. We have shown that the
set of codes of representations of elements of Lα(R) is the set of all a for which
Player I has a winning strategy in the Borel game G(a), as was to be shown. 
Remark 4.3. The fact that all auxilary games were Borel in a uniform way was
crucial in the proof of Lemma 4.2. In fact, the set
⋃
α<γ11
Repα is not in a
R∆11. 
Definition 4.4. The order of a proto-representation is defined inductively: the
order of a proto-representation of the form (0, x) is 0; the order of a proto-
representation of the form (φ, xβ , xb) is the maximum of |xβ |≺ and the order of
xb.
Thus, if x ∈ Repα, then the order of x is strictly less than α.
We now proceed to the definability game and, with it, to the proof of Lemma
3.1. The idea of the game is very simple: two players argue whether a formula
holds of some sets in a given level of the L(R)-hierarchy. However, its description
is lengthy. This is due to two complications that arise: the first one is that we need
the payoff of the game to be ∆11. This requires us speaking about representations
of sets instead of sets directly. The second one is that many rules need to be put
into place to ensure that the players are honest in their moves.
Fix some n ∈ N, a parameter xA ∈ Lα(R), and a set
A ∈ Σn(Lα(R), xA),
say, A = {y ∈ Lα(R) : Lα(R) |= φ(y, xA)}. In the definability game, Player I
attempts to show that a given y ∈ Lγ11 (R) belongs to the set A above, i.e., that
(5) Lα(R) |= φ(y, xA)
We assume that the scopes of all negations in φ (and in all formulae appearing
below) are atomic formulae. We also assume that no implications appear in φ.
The game will involve Players I and II playing purported representations of sets
in Lα(R). Fix some representation (φ, xα, xa) for A and some real x
∗ coding it.
Let a ∈ R; we define the game DA(a). If a does not code a pair (0, y) or a triple
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(φy, xy , xc), the game ends immediately and Player I loses. Otherwise, the game
begins. We will describe the rules in the case that a codes a triple; the rules
in the case that a codes a pair (0, y) are analogous; soon, we will restrict our
attention to reals a of order <α (as the reader will soon realize, this restriction
postpones a certain complication in the definition of the game). Player I’s goal is
to convince Player II that the triple coded by a is a representation for some y such
that equation (5) is satisfied. The game is defined from x∗ and a (as well as the
parameters defining , which we assumed for simplicity to be non-existent).
The rules of the game give the players opportunities to initiate subgames
in which they challenge the other’s moves. If this happens at any point, the
definability game will end and the winner will be declared to be the winner of the
subgame. We do not need to speak about winning strategies for the subgame—we
can simply ask the players to play it. All subgames will have Borel payoff and real
moves; this allows the players to check during the game whether a given aR∆11
fact holds.
At the beginning of of DA(a), Player II has the oportunity to claim that
(φy , xy, xc) is not a representation of an element of Lα(R),
i.e., that (φy , xy, xc) 6∈ Repα. If this happens, then the game is over and Player
I wins if, and only if, the challenged object is indeed a representation; otherwise
Player II wins. If Player II does not claim either of the two statements above, the
game proceeds.
At the beginning of turn k, Players I and II have defined a proto-
representation (φk, xβk , xbk) for some set B
k and finitely many proto-
representations (ψwki , xwki , xdki ) for some sets w
k
i . Player I claims that ~w
k ∈ Bk,
i.e., that
Lβk(R) |= φk(~w
k, bk);
Player II claims otherwise. Below, we write ~w = ~wk and b = bk for notational
simplicity; as before, we might abuse notation by assuming ~w is a tuple of length
1 and simply writing w. We define the order of the game at turn k to be the
maximum of the orders of w and b. Let us describe the rules of the game by cases:
(1) If φk is of the form ψ ∨ χ, then Player I selects either ψ or χ. We set φk+1
equal to that choice and leave the rest of the objects unchanged.
(2) If φk is of the form ψ ∧χ, then Player II selects either ψ or χ. We set φk+1
equal to that choice and leave the rest of the objects unchanged.
(3) If φk(w, b) is of the form ∃z ψ(w, b, z), then Player I must play a proto-
representation xz which is allegedly a representation in Repβk of some z ∈
Lβk(R) such that
Lβk(R) |= ψ(w, b, z).
At this point, Player II has the opportunity to object to the fact that xz
belongs to Repβk . If so, the game ends and Player I wins if, and only if,
xz ∈ Repβk . If Player II does not challenge Player I’s move, then the game
continues with φk+1 = ψ and z added to ~w; the rest of the objects remain
unchanged.
(4) If φk(w, b) is of the form ∀z ψ(w, b, z), then Player II must play a proto-
representation xz which is allegedly a representation in Repβk of of some
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z ∈ Lβk(R) such that
Lβk(R) 6|= ψ(w, b, z).
As before, Player I has the opportunity to object to the fact that xz belongs
to Repβk . If so, the game ends and Player I wins if, and only if, xz 6∈ Repβk .
If Player I does not challenge Player II’s move, then the game continues
with φk+1 = ψ and z added to ~w; the rest of the objects remain unchanged.
(5) If φk is a non-negated atomic formula, then it is of the form u ∈ v, where
u and v are any of b or some wi; both u and v have associated proto-
representations that have been played in one of the previous turns, or given
by the initial data. There are three subcases that we need to distinguish:
(a) Suppose that the proto-representation associated to v is of the form
(0, x), for some x ∈ R, and the proto-representation associated to u is
of the form (0, y), for some y ∈ R; then the game ends. Player I wins
if, and only if, y ∈ x; otherwise, Player II wins.
(b) Suppose that the proto-representation associated to v is of the form
(0, x), for some x ∈ R, but the one associated to u is of the form
(φu, xηu , xu).
The problem is that—in principle—(φu, xηu , xu) might be a compli-
cated (true) representation of a simple set.6 The game proceeds as
follows: since the proto-representation associated to v is of the form
(0, x), it is a true representation of some real number. Player I must
thus play a natural number n ∈ x and claim that (φu, xηu , xu) is a
representation of n, i.e., that, there is u′ ∈ Lηu(R) represented by xu
such that
Lηu(R) |= φu(u
′,m) if, and only if, m < n.
Player II must object by playing some m0 ∈ N such that one of the
following holds:
(i) m0 < n but Lηu(R) 6|= φu(u
′,m0); or
(ii) n < m0 and Lηu(R) |= φu(u
′,m0).
During the remainder of the game, the two players must determine
whether
Lηu(R) |= φu(u
′,m0).
We know how to do this: namely, we set Bk+1 equal to{
m ∈ N : Lηu(R) |= φu(u
′,m)
}
or {
m ∈ N : Lηu(R) |= ¬φu(u
′,m)
}
,
according to which objection was raised by Player II, and work with
the canonical representation for Bk+1; and ~wk+1 = (0,m0).
(c) Suppose that v has an associated proto-representation of the form
(χ, xη, xav ).
This case is similar to the previous one: Player I claims u ∈ v, i.e.,
Lη(R) |= χ(u, av).
6Originally introduced into the game by either player.
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The problem (as before) is that the proto-representation
(φu, xηu , xu)
associated to u might be unnecessarily complicated. We ask Player I
to decide whether xηu ≺ xη. To ensure that Player I tells the truth,
we then ask Player II to decide whether xηu ≺ xη. If the two players
disagree on this, the game ends, with the winner being declared as the
winner of the subgame that determines whether xηu ≺ xη.
Otherwise, suppose first that the players both believe that xηu ≺
xη. At this point, Player II can claim that the proto-representation
(φu, xηu , xu) associated to u does not belong to Repη. If so, then—as
above—the game ends, and the winner of the game is the winner of the
game given by Lemma 4.2 applied to xη and the proto-representation
associated to u.7 If Player II chooses not to make that claim, the game
continues with φk+1 = χ, xβk+1 = xη, xbk+1 = xav , and ~w
k+1 = u.
If the players both believe that xη  xηu , then we need to argue as
above. If u truly is an element of v, then u must have a representation
of order strictly less than η. Player I must play such a representa-
tion, say, (φu′ , xηu′ , xu′). As usual, Player II may object by claiming
that (φu′ , xηu′ , xu′) 6∈ Repη, in which case the game ends and the win-
ner is declared according as whether (φu′ , xηu′ , xu′) ∈ Repη or not;
or by claiming that (φu′ , xηu′ , xu′) is not in fact a representation of
the same object as (φu, xηu , xu). Let u
′ be the object represented by
(φu′ , xηu′ , xu′) (if any). This is now treated much like the case (5b).
Player II must claim one of the following:
(i) u′ 6⊂ u; or
(ii) u 6⊂ u′.
Assume without loss of generality that it is the first alternative that
is claimed. Player II must play a proto-representation (φv′ , xηv′ , xv′)
for a set v′ witnessing that u′ 6= u. Player I can make the usual
objection that (φv′ , xηv′ , xv′) 6∈ Repη′u , in which case the game pro-
ceeds as usual. Otherwise, Player I may claim that v′ 6∈ u′ or that
v′ ∈ u. In the former case, the game proceeds with the proto-
representation (φu′ , xηu′ , xu′ ) for u
′ = Bk+1 and wk+1 equal to the
proto-representation (φv′ , xηv′ , xv′). The other case is similar.
(6) Finally, if φk is a negated atomic formula, then it is of the form u 6∈ v,
where u and v are any of b or some wi; both u and v have associated proto-
representations that have been played in one of the previous turns. One
distinguishes three subcases and proceeds as in case (5).
The hope is that both players play only real representations when they should
play proto-representations and that the initial triples are also real representations.
Let us say that a (partial) play in which these conditions are satisfied is honest.
A key remark is that, if a play p is honest, then the order of p decreases after each
time the players find themselves in one of situations (5) or (6) (assuming the game
does not end). This implies that an honest play in which both players accept each
7Note that this proto-representation could have been played by Player II at an earlier turn;
this does not matter.
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other’s moves will end after finitely many turns by one of the winning conditions
in clauses (5)–(6) and the winner will be defined then.
If our expectations on the honesty of the players are not realized, the game will
end in one of two possible ways: by means of a subgame initiated by a player
challenging the other player’s choice, in which case the winner of the definability
game will be the winner of the subgame; or perhaps after infinitely many turns, if a
player made improper moves and was not challenged by the opponent (or perhaps
if one of the initial triples was not a real representation and this was not noticed
by Player II). In this latter case, we declare Player I as the winner.8
There are three types of subgames that can be initiated: the one given by Lemma
4.2, its dual—that in which the roles of Player I and Player II are reversed—, and
the game associated to the prewellordering ≺. Games of each of those three types
are uniformly in∆11, and defined using the initial parameters, as well as parameters
played during the (main) game.
Thus, Player I wins a run p of the game if, and only if, a codes a triple and
(1) There is some k such that a player breaks a rule during turn k and the first
player to do so is Player II;
(2) There is some k such that a player initiates a challenge during turn k and
p ↾ (k,∞) is a win for Player I in the subgame;
(3) The game ends at a finite stage k by Player I fulfilling the condition in case
(5) or case (6) above; or
(4) After infinitely many steps, no player has won or initiated a challenge.
The first condition is Σ01(x
∗, a, p). The second condition is ∆11(x
∗, p). Lastly, the
third condition is Σ01(p) and the fourth condition is Π
0
1(p). Hence, the payoff set is
in ∆11(x
∗, a, p).
Lemma 4.5. Player I has a winning strategy in DA(a) if, and only if, a codes a
representation in Repα of some set y ∈ Lα(R) such that
(6) Lα(R) |= φ(y, xA).
Proof. Clearly it is necessary that a code a representation in Repα for some set
y ∈ Lα(R) in order for Player I to have a winning strategy. Suppose it does and
that (6) holds. The strategy for Player I is simple—essentially, she will always tell
the truth. This will ensure that the intuitive interpretation of the game in terms
of Player I claiming that a formula holds in an initial segment of L(R) and Player
II claiming otherwise is accurate.
If Player I’s assertions are ever challenged by Player II, the subgame can be won
as in Lemma 4.2. Otherwise, at a given turn k, if (φk, xβk , xbk) and (ψwk , xwk , xdk)
are as in the definition of the game, then they will be true representations. If φk is
a disjunction, then one of the disjuncts will hold in Lβk(R) and Player I will choose
it. If φk is a conjunction, then both conjuncts will hold in Lβk(R) and so it will
not matter which one Player II chooses. If φk is of the form ∃z ψ, then there really
must be a witness to ψ in Lβk(R), and Player I will play a true representation of
this witness, say, of minimal order. If φk is of the form ∀z ψ and Player II plays
a proto-representation which is not a representation of an element of Lβk(R), or
has order higher than that permissible by the rules of the game, then Player I will
challenge Player II’s move and win the game as in Lemma 4.2. Otherwise, Player II
8This choice will not be very consequential. Such an outcome will not occur in any case of
interest, but it needs to be considered to make the game zero-sum.
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will play a representation of an element of Lβk(R) and ψ will hold of this element.
If φk is atomic or negated atomic, then it will be true, so that either the game will
end and be won by Player I or continue according to the form of the representations
relevant to the turn of the game the players are in. As remarked earlier, the order of
every honest play of the game decreases after each time the players find themselves
in one of situations (5) or (6). Hence, the strategy just described ensures that either
a player will initiate a challenge that will end by Player I winning, or that the game
will end after finitely many turns and be won by Player I.
Similarly, if Player I has a winning strategy, then (6) must hold, for otherwise
essentially the same strategy for Player II will be a winning strategy. The point is
that if Player II plays properly, every play will end either after finitely many turns
or with a subgame. 
Thus, given a set of reals A ∈ Lα+1(R) and a code x
∗ of a representation for A
(which exists by Lemma 4.1), one has
A =
{
y ∈ R : Player I has a winning strategy in DA(〈0, y〉)
}
.
Since DA(〈0, y〉) is in ∆
1
1(x
∗, 〈0, y〉), we have
P(R) ∩ Lα+1(R) ⊂ a
R∆11.
Therefore, the proof of Lemma 3.1 is complete.
5. Derived model theorems
In this section, we prove two lemmata that tie determinacy in Lϑ(R) to the
existence of countably iterable extender models of Zermelo set theory with infin-
itely many Woodin cardinals. The first lemma is proved just like its analogue for
L(R). The second lemma is also similar to its analogue for L(R) but has some
differences. We will assume some familiarity with the theory of extender models,
e.g., as presented in Mitchell-Steel [MS94] or Steel [St10].
We note that every interval of the form [(δ21)
Lϑα (R), ϑα] is a gap (cf. the proof of
Lemma 3.10 above).
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that for every α < ω1, there is a countable, countably iterable
extender model of
Z+ “Vλ+α exists and λ is a limit of Woodin cardinals.”
Then Lϑ(R) |= AD.
Proof. Let α < ω1 be large. We show that
(7) Lϑα(R) |= AD.
Let M be an extender model as in the statement and let {δi : i ∈ N} enumerate
the first infinitely many Woodin cardinals of M . As usual, M is a model of the
Axiom of Choice. Since M is a model of Powerset, we have
M |= “for every κ, κ+ exists.”
A consequence of this is that M |= KP; thus M can define the class (L(A))M for
all A ∈M . Assume without loss of generality that M is minimal, in the sense that
M |= V = L(Vλ).
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Since M |= ZC, it can form ultrapowers of itself in the usual (non-fine-structural)
sense and realize them e.g., as the union of all ultrapowers of initial segments of
its cumulative hierarchy. One can carry out the usual proofs of basic facts about
the stationary tower Q<δ, as well as the proof of Woodin’s derived model theorem
(e.g., the one in [Sta]) within M .9 Suppose g∗ ⊂ Coll(ω, λ) is M -generic. Since
M |= ZC+ KP, then
M [g∗] |= ZC+ KP,
(this follows, e.g., from work of Mathias [Mat15]) so that if R∗ is the set of reals of
a symmetric collapse at λ, then
(8) L(R∗)M |= Z+ KP
(for the proof of this in the case of L, see Gostanian [Go80, Theorem 1.6].) Since
λ is a limit of Woodin cardinals in M ,
(9) L(R∗)M |= AD+ DC.
Now let g ⊂ Coll(ω,R) be V -generic. In V [g] let {xi : i ∈ R} enumerate R and find
a sequence Mi of extender models such that for each i ∈ N,
(1) Mi+1 is the direct limit of an iteration tree on Mi of length ω by extenders
with critical point above the ith Woodin cardinal of Mi and length below
the i+ 1th Woodin cardinal of Mi+1;
(2) If ji : M0 → Mi+1 is the embedding, then ji ∈ V and there is an Mi+1-
generic gi ⊂ Coll(ω, j(δi)) such that xi ∈Mi+1[gi].
If so, then, letting M∞ be the direct limit of {Mi : i ∈ N}, it follows by the
restriction on the extenders allowed in the trees that M∞ is wellfounded. If j is
the embedding, then j(λ) = ωV1 . By (9) and the homogeneity of the symmetric
collapse,
M |= “ every set in L(R˙) is determined and L(R˙) |= DC,”
where R˙ is a name for the set of reals of the symmetric collapse. By elementarity,
(10) L(R∗)M∞ |= AD+ DC.
The symmetric collapse can be chosen (in V [g]) in such a way that it absorbs the
generic gi for each i ∈ N, in which case (R
∗)M∞ = RV , so L(R∗)M∞ is of the form
Lξ(R). Suppose h ⊂ Coll(ω, λ) is M∞-generic and chosen so that the symmetric
collapse induced by h absorbs gi for each i ∈ N. By the remark before equation
(8), we have
M∞[h] |= ZC.
Since Coll(ω, λ) has the λ+-chain condition,
(11) M∞[h] |= “Vα exists.”
Now, clearly, we have
Lξ(R) ⊂M∞[h],
so Lξ(R) satisfies AD by (10); it satisfies Z by (8), and it satisfies “Vα exists” by
(11). By minimality, ϑα < ξ, which completes the proof. 
9This is where we use the assumption that α is large. For instance, the proof in [Sta] involves
building conditions for the stationary tower Q<δ starting from elementary substructures of Vλ+ω.
We have not attempted to prove (7) from optimal hypotheses; it seems plausible that a more
careful argument shows e.g., that Lϑ1 (R) |= AD if there is a countable, ω1-iterable extender
model of ZF - Powerset with a limit of Woodin cardinals.
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Lemma 5.2. Suppose that Lϑ(R) |= AD. Then, for each α < ω1, there is an
ω1-iterable extender model of
Z+ “Vλ+α exists and λ is a limit of Woodin cardinals.”
Proof. Suppose that Lϑ(R) |= AD. Let α < ω1 be large and find some γ < ϑ such
that
(1) Lγ(R) is a model of Z +“Vα exists,”
(2) if x, y ∈ R and x is definable in Lγ(R) from y and ordinal parameters,
then there is γ′ < γ such that x is definable in Lγ′(R) from y and ordinal
parameters.
For example, one could take γ to be least such that
V
Lϑα+ω (R)
α+ω ⊂ Lγ(R).
Clearly Lγ(R) is a model of “Vα exists.” Moreover, if a ∈ Lβ(R), with β < γ,
then—by minimality—there is n ∈ N such that
V
Lϑα+ω (R)
α+n 6⊂ Lβ(R).
Thus, there is a stage β′+1 ∈ (β, γ) at which a new element of Vα+n is constructed
and, by Proposition 2.2, there is a surjection from Vα+n ∩ Jβ′(R) to Jβ′(R) in
Jβ′+1(R). In particular, there is a surjection from Vα+n ∩ Jβ′(R) to a. Hence,
P(a)Lϑα+ω (R) ⊂ V
Lϑα+ω (R)
α+n+1 and so
P(a)Lϑα+ω (R) = P(a)Lγ(R) ∈ Lγ(R),
so we have that Lγ(R) |= Z. Lastly, the definition implies that γ is a cardinal
(in fact, the largest cardinal) of Lϑα+ω(R) greater than Θ
Lϑα+ω(R), so that (by the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem), we have
Lγ(R) ≺1 Lϑα+ω(R).
Hence, if x, y ∈ R and x is definable in Lγ(R) from y and ordinal parameters, then
Lγ(R) |= ∃γ
′
(
x is definable in Lγ′(R) from y and ordinal parameters
)
,
so γ is as desired.
The first thing to verify is that
Lγ(R) |= “Mouse Capturing.”
Recall that “Mouse Capturing” is the statement that for every pair of reals (x, y), x
is definable from y and ordinal parameters if, and only if, x belongs to a countably
iterable extender model over y. In Schindler-Steel [SchSt, Theorem 3.4.6], it is
shown that for all reals x, y, the following are equivalent:
(1) x is definable from y and ordinal parameters in Lβ(R) for some β < γ,
(2) x belongs to an extender model over y which is countably iterable by an
iteration strategy in Lγ(R).
The equivalence is stated modulo an inductive hypothesis W ∗α, but this hypothesis
is proved (see the argument in pp. 157-158 of [SchSt]) under the assumption of AD
(in L(R), but the argument goes through in Lγ(R)). By our choice of γ, this shows
that Lγ(R) satisfies Mouse Capturing.
The second thing to verify is that
Lγ(R) |= AD
+;
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this follows from the usual proof for L(R): Ordinal Determinacy follows from
the facts that by Kechris-Kleinberg-Moschovakis-Woodin [KKMW, Theorem 1.1],
(δ21)
Lγ(R) is a limit of cardinals with the strong partition property, and that by a
theorem due independently to Moschovakis and Woodin (see Larson [La17] for a
proof), this implies <(δ21)
Lγ(R)-determinacy. Since
L(δ21)
Lγ(R)(R) ≺1 Lγ(R),
this implies Ordinal Determinacy in Lγ(R).
That every set of reals is∞-Borel in Lγ(R) follows from the argument in [La17].
(It uses the fact that (Σ21)
Lγ(R) has the scale property, which is proved by following
the argument of [MaSt08] as in Lemma 3.10).
We have checked that Lγ(R) satisfies AD
+ and Mouse Capturing. Now, let β < α
be arbitrary and let xβ be a real such that β is recursive in xβ . Define the theory
S ≡ Z+ KP+ AD+ + DC+ “Mouse Capturing” + “Vβ exists.”
Let κ be least such that Jκ(R) |= S; clearly κ < γ and, in fact, κ < (δ
2
1)
Lγ(R). We
now run the proof of Steel-Woodin [StW16, Theorem 7.2] for the theory S within
Lγ(R) (so that κ here takes the role of the ordinal denoted by γ therein), except
that we consider the pointclass (Σ21(xβ))
Jκ(R), rather than (Σ21)
Jκ(R). Similarly, one
replaces the L[E]-construction on p. 325 of [StW16] by an L[E](xβ)-construction.
Letting M , N , and ξ be as in [StW16], and M0 be set of all elements of M |ξ which
are definable from xβ in M |ξ, the argument shows that M0 has the form Jζ(N0),
for some ζ and some extender model N0 over xβ and, moreover, the following hold:
(1) N0 satisfies “there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals”;
(2) no initial segment of M0 projects to N0;
(3) M0 has an (ω1, ω1)-iteration strategy Σ0;
(4) the derived model of M0 at its limit of Woodin cardinals satisfies S.
Now, let λ be the limit of Woodin cardinals of M0. Then, an ordinal η > λ is
a cardinal of M0 if, and only if, it is a cardinal of a generic extension of M0 by
Coll(ω, λ) if, and only if, it is a cardinal of the derived model of M0. Since this
derived model satisfies S, it follows that M0 has β-many cardinals above λ and,
since M0 is a model of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, we have M0 |= “Vβ
exists.” Since β < α was arbitrary and α was arbitrary, the result follows. 
Theorem 1.3 is immediate from Theorem 3.4, Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.1.
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